The third section is broken down into two further parts. The first attempts to sketch out how America's identity as an imperial society and its quest for symbolic preeminence intimately structure the debates over the legitimacy of American sacrifice in Iraq. The second further explores how lingering tensions between republican and liberal conceptions of citizenship continue to set the tone of the debate over the distribution of sacrifice in Iraq and thus mirror more profound social and symbolic fissures within the United States. In conclusion, I ask whether the newspaper debate over the war in Iraq points to a new or continued crisis of the American imperial model of society.
The American imperial society and the imperial regime of citizenship.

Imperial competition
This study builds on historian Christophe Charle's (2001 Charle's ( , also 2004 Charle's ( and 2005 model of the "imperial society" adapted from his comparative social and cultural history of the French, German, and British empires of the early 20 th century. Unlike traditional empires (Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire), imperial societies claim a monopoly on symbolic capital in world affairs in the name of "manifest destiny" (Charle 2005 ). Contrary to "ordinary nations" the imperial society claims "to be a universal cultural model with the vocation to draw into its orbit less autonomous nations and peoples" (Charle 2005 : 125, author's translation). For the United States, this involves posturing America as a reluctant giant commissioned by History to defend freedom across the globe (Aron 1973; Kaspi 1986; Stephanson 1995; Pieterse 2004; Kaplan 2004 and 2003 on the "cultural aspects of US imperialism and exceptionalism). So, in addition to the other objectives of its foreign policy, the imperial society is also fiercely engaged with other societies in a contest for symbolic preeminence. This is what I understand hereafter by the imperial society's external logic of domination.
Like Christophe Charle's own scholarship, this study draws extensively on Pierre
Bourdieu's concepts of social space (espace social), field (champ) and habitus. The social space draws out a "map" upon which the position of all social actors can be represented in relation to one another, thus enabling us to draw a portrait of the relations between dominant and dominated groups in the most general sense (Bourdieu 1979: 189, author's translation). The "global volume of capital" or wealth individuals, social classes, class fractions and groups possess, as well as their relative shares of more specific cultural, social, political and symbolic "assets," determine their positions in social space (Bourdieu 1979 : 128, author's translation). The field represents narrower relations of dominance within more specific terrains of struggle upon which social actors, groups, classes and class fractions act and compete to augment or reproduce shares of influence or capital specific to the field in question (Bourdieu 1979 and 1994) . Though fields are as diverse as the facets of social and professional life itself (such as the journalistic field), this study is mainly interested in the political field, the field of citizenship, the field of memory, and the field of power, and their corollaries in global social space (an international version of the first concept).
Symbolic capital approximates legitimacy or notoriety; however, like paper money it only holds weight if the value is accredited by others (Bourdieu 1994) . The state, other powerful entities, and dominant class fractions holding vast shares of symbolic capital predominate in the field of power 3 (Bourdieu 1994) . Symbolic capital naturalizes the exercise of power, by attesting to the fact that those who wield it possess the socially sanctioned competences required to rule. (Bourdieu 1979: 286) .
Lastly, Habitus defines an individual our group's vantage point on social space, the diverse fields of struggles within it and the strategies they employ to meet the challenges of their unique position (Bourdieu 1979 and 1994) . Habitus thus also accounts for the consistency of habit, tastes, fashion sense, mind frames, social goals and strategies found among peoples of similar backgrounds. Importantly, habitus, like identity, is constituted through differentiation with other classes of habitus. As such, habitus is not an objective view on the field; it is always a point of view emanating from somewhere on the field, surveying its surroundings. It is thus only a partial representation of social space and the struggles within it, and as a creature of habit, it may become out of touch or maladapted to the changing realities of the social landscape (Bourdieu 1979 ).
"National habitus 4 ", on the other hand, designates a "unity of lifestyle" 5 proper to citizens or members of a common nation-state. This means at once the shared ideals of a society such as faith in "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," and the relatively similar vantage point it gives them on the world, or global social space. Far from a conceptual attempt to reify or naturalize national divides, national habitus tries to account for their social construction. At the same time, it explains the creation of stereotypes on other cultures more distant in habitus, as backwards, savage or uncivilized for instance.
[National habitus] is the product of the progressive insertion of every individual, family, peasant or urban community, or of every group in a network of external reference points defined by the elites and institutions (educational, administrative, religious, professional, etc.) that channels their common lines of social space (and available to individuals). States also generally recognize the value of university diplomas or professional accreditations, and structures social norms through courts and education systems (Bourdieu 1994) . 4 . This concept is Christophe Charle's, 2001 , not Bourdieu's. 5 . The quoted definition is Bourdieu's (1994: 22) , but relates to the 'domestic' class of habitus.
reaction in certain circumstances where survival outweighs daily processes of adaptation and short-term strategies" (Charle 2001: 203-204, author's translation) .
National habitus also designates how dominant elites translate their unique vantage point on global social space and the relevant resources in symbolic, economic, military, human, scientific and cultural capital upon which their society can count into foreign policy when they compete in the global fields of power, culture, economics and so on. By definition, imperial societies are preeminent in all or most of these fields 6 and hold sway over global affairs and institutions. However, because, all imperial societies claim large amounts of capital in most fields (or a more efficient, humane, just, righteous or rational mode of organizing their respective fields and hierarchies) they find each other in direct competition for symbolic capital (Charle 2001 (Charle , 2005 . This imperial competition reflects the projection of each imperial society's national habitus into the global realm in the form of a "civilizing duty" mentioned at the outset of this section (Charle 2001: 18, author's translation). The US' "humanitarian mission" (Charle 2005 : 126, author's translation), for instance, implies the express or even unexpressed intention of imprinting the social structures of the imperial metropole onto 'foreign' societies: 7 Western managerial culture and practices, capitalist democracy, free trade, "market civilization"
and individualism (Gill 2003) , neo-classical economics, rational choice theory (Gill 1986 ), governance and transparency (Best 2003) (Charle, 2001: 16-17, author's translation) ." 7 . Here I draw more or less explicitly on Johann Galtung's (1976) conception of "social imperialism." of 'future leaders' and ensure the necessary transfer of culture from metropole to periphery (Charle 2005) .
The imperial society thus at once engages in economic, cultural, social, institutional, political, environmental and sometimes territorial imperialism over global social space. Though rarely taken seriously by international relations scholars, symbolic competition ultimately translates the fact that the imperial societies expressly seek or believe peoples all over the world should emulate their domestic structures. Perhaps more fundamentally, symbolic competition is also a contest for the hearts and minds of the American people themselves. A state that enables its symbolic resources to deplete to critically low levels risks the possibility of losing legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens.
The regime of imperial citizenship.
The imperial society concept is not meant only to highlight the specific dynamics and interactions of the United States within the field of global politics. The 'traditional' logic of imperial power sketched out above is also doubled by an inward or internal logic of domination I call the imperial regime of citizenship. Traditionally, the debate around 'empire' in international relations theory has revolved around a narrow 'territorial' definition, as the annexation of foreign lands or peoples 8 . Rather, in the vein of scholars such as Raymond Aron (1973 ), David Campbell (1998 and Amy Kaplan (2004; , I
understand that the terms "foreign" and "outside" are not simply delineated by territory and geography. The "foreign" draws our attention to the cultural and political borders of citizenship perhaps even more than it does the juridical and territorial borders of states.
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According to these theoretical traditions, the United States qualifies as an 'empire' before we even begin to look at its 'foreign relations' or its global politics.
The imperial form of society uniquely structures the fields, classes of habitus and struggles taking place within its shifting borders, especially in the field of citizenship.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the global distribution of political, economic, (Sandel 1998: 318) . Similar justifications were given to exclude African Americans from fully participating in the army, especially in peacetime, or to organize them into segregated units (Krebs 2006) .
Feminists also point out that the citizen-soldier tradition has profound cultural ramifications for the establishment of gender roles in the United States, notably by 11 . The Militia Act of 1792 "fixed the principle of a universal military obligation in the statutory law of the new government, requiring the service of every able-bodied, white, male citizen, between the ages of eighteen and forty five, in his state's militia" (Snyder 2003: 187) . 12 . Inversely, however, if military service constitutes a civic obligation, it is often tied to benefits enjoyed in the community and often economic advantages, such as the GI Bill in the U.S (Kaspi 1986 
Crises of the American imperial society and the rise of neo-liberalism.
African American segregation in the armed forces ultimately collapsed as America faced war in Korea (Segal & Segal 1994) . From the 1930s on, the common story goes, the rise of liberalism provided the symbolic grounds on which African Americans could voice a counter-discourse against the exclusionary regime of republican citizenship The 1948 Integration Act granted women the right to serve as permanent members of the armed forces. The Act, however, fixed their participation at 2 % of all service members. US policymakers only lifted this cap in 1967. Since 1993, policy measures continue to exclude women from "those positions that involved with direct ground combat and in small amphibious vessels" (Titunik 2000: 243) . After decades of witch hunts, President Clinton approved the controversial "Don't ask. Don't tell" policy in 1993 which was supposed to represent a compromise See also Linda Kerber 1997 on the evolution of citizenship requirements in US with their specific forms of exclusion linked to class, race and gender.
See Krebs 2006, pp. 167-171 , for a short but effective summary of the challenges and struggles of Japanese Americans to obtain full citizenship rights. appealed to universal human rights to obtain equal opportunity in military service 16 .
Republicanism would have rather suggested that they claim citizenship by alluding to their show of patriotism and sacrifice in the Second World War; in short, because they had fulfilled their duty (Krebs 2006) . That strategy had failed decisively after the First World War, a fact that may effectively have favored the ascendancy of more radical
Black leaders such as Marcus Garvey in the Interwar period (Krebs 2006) . That African Americans now claimed citizenship based on rights rather than on having fulfilled their civic duties for the community marked a decisive break with the traditional framing of citizenship and sacrifice in the US.
Literature on citizenship and political economy evokes the rise of liberalism alternatively as a "public philosophy" (Sandel 1998) or rhetorical frame (Krebs 2006) , or alludes to the arrival of "late capitalism" (Feinman 2000) , or "disciplinary neoliberalism" (Gill 2003 themselves against those aberrant regimes they named "totalitarian" (Foucault 2004 ).
Friedrich Hayek (2002) , for one, wrote that both Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism shared common roots in socialism and the planned war economies. As Foucault (2004) explains, these postwar theorists believed that states followed an internal drive to expand until they would swallow "civil society" as a whole. The welfare state would grow into a totalitarian cancer. Thus only a thin red line separated « social security » from the « concentration camps » (Foucault 2004: 193) . So at the heart of postwar liberalism lay a fundamental critique of the rival imperial society's national habitus.
19 . However, inter-imperial competition with the Soviet Union also perverted the efforts of Blacks' and other Civil Rights activists at provoking societal change in the U.S. Too radical a program of reform, change or revolution opened the way for their opponents to charge them with subversion, antiAmericanism, and label them as Communists (Krebs 2006) . 20 . The literature which looks at the 'shift' to neo-liberalism as a global phenomenon from the 1970s on is extremely vast: see Cox 1990; Gill 1986 Gill , 1989 Helleiner 1995; Ruggie 1982; Keohane and Nye 1989 for a sampler of points of view across the spectrum. 21 . See The Mont Pelerin Society, http://www.montpelerin.org/home.cfm, retrieved Oct. 22, 2008. 22 . ORDO is the name of the German journal in which the doctrinal components of German "neo-liberal governmentality" (Foucault 2004: 191-220) ration of two to one compared to the numbers which could be mobilized (Gifford 2005: 204) . Popular outcry was dramatic. The Pentagon reacted swiftly to curb the racialization of military sacrifice by relegating Blacks into positions where they would not be as vulnerable to enemy fire. This policy had the effect of cutting African American casualties down to "about 12 percent," a proportion that better reflected "their share of the total U.S. population" (Segal & Segal 2004 : 19) . Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler (1997) deny the charge that Blacks were disproportionately killed in Vietnam or significantly so in any American war since the end of the conflict in Indochina. However, their analysis does not account for racial casualty variations across the duration of the war as do Gifford, and Segal and Segal. Yet the institution of the all-volunteer force in 1973 has reinforced many of the inequalities of racial and socioeconomic status it was to correct (Moskos 2005; Feinman 2000) . 25 First, the horizon of possibilities and thus the specific habituses of dominant and dominated groups in American society largely determined whether they would consider 
%). This gap dramatically widens if
we compare Hispanic mortalities to their overall proportion in the Active Duty forces, were they represent 8,6 % of all service members (Gifford 2005: 214) . According to Gifford: "The casualty rate among Hispanics during the war is 49 percent higher than their representation in the ground combat forces would suggest (p = .002), and 85 percent higher than Hispanics on active duty (p = .044). As expected, Hispanic war casualties fall below their portion of the US population (though this may reflect circumstances that effectively render many young, non-English-speaking Hispanics ineligible for military service)" (Gifford 2005: 215) . Hector Amaya (2007: 17-18) , however, argues that Hispanics are overrepresented in the allvolunteer force, that is when the number of Latino soldiers is considered in proportion to the actual number of Hispanics eligible for service. By comparison, however, the mortality rate amongst black soldiers falls short of their weight in the army overall, itself almost double of their actual weight in the population. During less combat intensive phases of the war, more characteristic of the Occupation, all racial group suffered casualties proportionate to their weight in the overall US population and tended to balance out (Gifford 2005) .
Newspapers and the War in Iraq:
National habitus and the symbolic economy of military sacrifice in Iraq:
On author's translation) in suggesting that when analyzing the debate over the legitimacy of sacrifice in Iraq, the "physical security" of the "imperial republic" is never understood distinctly from the "creation of an environment favorable to the flourishing of national values": in short, "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." 30 The symbolic rationales given to defend the war effort, and thus the sacrifice asked of the soldiers and their families, are effective insofar as they resonate with this national habitus: a common horizon of "social reference points" with which the American people can identify, in no small part because of the "simplified social representations" diffused by the mass media (Charle 2001: 201 contests that Americans of the 'Greatest Generation' could count on any more "stark moral clarity" of purpose when entering in the Second World War than the US can today in Iraq. Importantly, both of these narratives take the Second World War as a common 31 . This point on identity and difference is now banal, see Campbell 1998. 32 . Interestingly, though, he reaffirms that WWII marks the central reference point for memory as D-Day "will never be surpassed in courage" (WSJ, June 7, 2004) .
"place of memory," 33 a turning point when America decisively defeated the Nazi dystopia; in both cases, it is constructed as a set reference for 'just wars' to come, ones in which the ends justify the loss of American lives beyond the shadow of a doubt. The Nazi dictatorship first becomes the supreme emblem of everything that is un-American, everything that is intolerable. In this rhetorical move, the social consensus on American identity operates through the "rejection of the stereotype" (Charle 2001: 203) The superiority complex that permeates the above article is shamelessly mirrored in another statement:
For every reason, from the humanitarian to the geopolitical to the military, Iraq is a war that America must win in the hegemonic, even colonial sense. It is a test to our civilization's commitment to the good against the alluring notion of menace-as-power that has gripped so much of the Muslim world (WSJ, Dec. 8, 2006) . Interestingly, supporters of the war appeal to aims far removed from the purely 'material' or 'rational' realm of existence. But far from pushing us to dismiss these 34 . Though this is certainly one of the most radical affirmations of the imperial society's national habitus, at this same time I believe that it more vocally and systematically articulates the themes that underlie many of the other contributions. In this sense it is also indicative of the more mainstream rhetoric. Shelby Steele, the author of the contribution, himself believes that political correctness is undermining serious appreciation and debate over the issues. 
Economies of sacrifice and social fissures.
A 2006 Christmas editorial in USA Today exclaimed: "In Iraq, the troops are surrounded by hardship and a frenzy of violence. Back home, the frenzy is one of excess:
shoppers battling for parking spaces in malls, snapping up everything from flat-panel TVs to the latest video games" (USA Today, Dec. 22, 2006 Supporters of the war also ask for the reintroduction of the draft. Of course, the draft that one "inactive" marine corporal writing a column in Newsweek has in mind is nothing like 42 . The title of a song by American folk-singer Phil Ochs. 43 . NYT, July 6, 2007; Jun. 17, 2002; 44 . NYT, Mar. 9, 2007; Sep.9, 2003. 45 . WSJ, Dec. 8, 2006 and May 2, 2006; USA Today Jan. 29, 2007. conscription enable opponents of the conflict to sap support for the war by threatening the serenity of Americans who live in a "golden bubble" (The Nation, June 7, 2004) , all the while appealing to patriotic themes. But on the other hand, some supporters of the war, as we have seen, call for conscription because they envisage it as the only 'real' strategy for America to win. For this reason, The Nation exclaims that calling for the draft in order to generate opposition to the war amounts to playing with fire (The Nation, June 7, 2004) .
At the other end of the spectrum, supporters of the war in the Wall Street Journal During the Vietnam War, Americans were very conscious of the inequalities inherent in the selective service pool, and they made powerful arguments against the war (Baskir & Strauss 1978 Vietnam-era style outcry are sufficiently strong to motivate affirmative-action policies on racial sacrifice within the army. Interestingly, these policies essentially contradict the prevalent form of neo-liberal culture, which cautions against state intervention in "markets," and in this case the market for sacrifice.
It has been argued that the all-volunteer Army could not meet its recruitment goals were it not for the vast pool of black enlistees upon which it can draw (Segal & Verdugo 1994; Segal & Segal 2005) . This illustrates that while the Pentagon seeks to curb the inequality in military sacrifice to avert the point of crisis when fighting its foreign wars, paradoxically, the all-volunteer force is structurally dependent on the very racial inequalities that push potential soldiers into its ranks. This indicates that the imperial model of society remains well in place even though Blacks are no longer employed as 'canon fodder,' as they were in the early Vietnam War. However, recent military sociology has raised the alarming prospect that this role is now devolving to Hispanics (Gifford 2005) who are largely overrepresented in combat arms of the army and marines (Amaya 2007; Segal & Segal 2004 ).
The neo-liberal economy of sacrifice has also significantly narrowed the proportion of citizens directly involved in the war, reducing the likelihood that the strain of sacrifice will push the American population to the brink of revolt as it did a generation earlier. In effect, the majority of the population feels no direct consequences of the war, and thus has no personal stake in victory or defeat. At worst they will eventually awake from a 'nightmare.' As the late military sociologist Charles Moskos, a fervent partisan of the draft, keenly noted in 2005:
The mass mobilization of the reserves and the National Guard has created neither widespread public support nor opposition to the war. This is because the troops who have borne the burden of the Iraq War have been disproportionately drawn from small-town America and the inner cities, not from those social groups who shape national policy (Moskos 2005: 669) .
Over time, the narrowing of the pool of combatants to select groups of citizens appears to have increased their sense of isolation as well as that of their families and friends, as shown above. Though patriots they may be, soldiers and their social circles take note that little sacrifice has been asked of other citizens. This appears especially painful to them as they must return to Iraq for multiple tours increasing the likelihood that fate will eventually deal them a 'bad hand.' Despite its claims to being the land of opportunity, a new war has painfully reminded the American imperial society that it remains founded on two classes of citizenship: those who shop, and those who fight … and die (NYT Oct. 20, 2007) .
The experiences of Vietnam and Iraq both show that America's desire to shape global politics is taxing. Not only lives lost and grieving families, it may eventually deplete the imperial society's symbolic resources: the stability, for instance, of America's collective identity constructs, narratives and self-understanding as an "exceptional nation" and universalist model. Sacrifice, I wrote earlier, is intimately linked to the citizen's love of the state and the ideals on which it is founded. Wars will be deemed just and unjust insofar as they espouse the spirit of these ideals. To die well means that sacrifice will be conform to the ideals of the Republic. For America, this means faith in freedom, equality of opportunity and social mobility. 
